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Introduced in 1999, Formed Police Units constitute a relatively recent invention in the history 
of UN peacekeeping. Yet, currently more than 10,000 individuals are deployed in such units. 
Their members are UN civilian police officers but – like military personnel – they may be 
given executive mandates. Consequently, (the optimal regulation of) their legal position 
(whether equivalent to that of military members of national contingents or of UN experts on 
mission) and (of) their criminal accountability (exclusive contributing State jurisdiction 
and/or permissibility of host State criminal jurisdiction) have been a subject of prolonged 
disagreement. The legal-political struggle between the UN Secretariat (Office of Legal 
Affairs) and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations concerning these issues has 
triggered important clarifications of the existing rules and led to revisions of legal 
instruments, including the most recent amendments to the UN Model Memorandum of 
Understanding.  
Through a study of this process, the present article aims to clarify the legal status and 
criminal accountability of FPU officers, as well as to predict the stability of the current legal 
status quo. In addition, the analysis of these issues provides valuable insights into the relevant 
practice of and priorities within the UN and among troop and police contributing countries. It 
thus even helps assess chances that military members of national contingents may in the 
future be subjected to the criminal jurisdiction of host States. Last but not least, the study 
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Whereas civilian police personnel have formed part of United Nations (UN) field missions 
since 1960, formed police units (FPUs) have been utilized for less than two decades.1 Today, 
FPU officers – amounting to about seventy percent of all police personnel currently deployed 
by the UN2 – constitute one of the largest personnel categories (next only to military members 
of national contingents (MMsNCs) and to local civilian personnel) in UN peacekeeping 
operations.3  
In introducing formed police units in the UN (peacekeeping) system, existing 
personnel categories were apparently taken as examples, and legal arrangements applicable to 
those were followed to the extent feasible and justified by the characteristics of FPU officers 
and by the nature of their functions. However, members of FPUs constitute a Janus-faced 
group, resembling in significant respects two distinct personnel categories employed in UN 
peacekeeping operations: experts on mission and MMsNCs. They are UN civilian police 
(CIVPOL) officers. Accordingly, their overall status is similar to that of individually 
seconded UN (civilian) police personnel (individual police officers or IPOs) who are 
unanimously recognized to have the status of experts on mission for the United Nations. 
However, FPUs’ mandate – while in essence similar to the traditional CIVPOL tasks – may 
involve the use of firearms and executive functions usually preserved for military personnel. 
In addition, the manner and structure wherein they are contributed to the UN resembles the 
contribution of military contingents by member States.4 However, the status, immunities and 
criminal accountability of IPOs differ significantly from the relevant rules applicable to 
MMsNCs.5 For inter alia these reasons, (the optimal regulation of) the status of members of 
FPUs and the extent and holders of criminal and disciplinary authority over them have been 
subject of protracted debate. 
In spite of such controversies and of the fact that FPUs have become a central factor in 
UN peacekeeping, legal scholarship has shown very little interest in (members of) formed 
police units and in particular in their status, immunities and criminal accountability.6 In 
contrast, these issues have been contentious for over a decade between troop and police 
contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs) (members of the UN General Assembly’s Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34)7) and the UN (Secretariat). The position of the 
                                                 
1 See Section II, infra. 
2 S. Sebastián, The Role of Police in UN Peace Operations: Filling the Gap in the Protection of Civilians from 
Physical Violence, Civilians in Conflict, Policy Brief No. 3 (Stimson Center, 2015) 11. 
3 See fact sheets on ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml> and the UN Police website on FPUs at 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/units.shtml>. 
4 See Section II, infra, for further details. 
5 See Section III.1, infra. 
6 These issues are, however, addressed in relation to UN civilian police personnel in general in e.g. A.J. Miller, 
‘United Nations Experts on Mission and their Privileges and Immunities’ (2007) 4 IOLR 11 and B. Oswald and 
A. Bates, ‘Privileges and Immunities of United Nations Police’ (2010) 14 Journal of International Peacekeeping 
375. The latter study and another work published by the same authors touch upon some of these issues in relation 
to FPU officers in particular but do so in passing. See Oswald and Bates, ‘Privileges and Immunities of United 
Nations Police’ 390, positing without any discussion or explanation that all UN police personnel, including 
members of FPUs, are granted the status of experts on mission under UN status of forces agreements, and B. 
Oswald, H. Durham and A. Bates, Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operations (OUP 2010) 392, n. 3 and 
accompanying text, noting the applicability of the current version of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) ‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’ (July 
2003) UN Doc DPKO/CPD/DDCPO/2003/001, as amended by Code Cable 2697 of 7 October 2005 
<http://www.pseataskforce.org/en/tools> to members FPUs. On this development, see Section IV.2, infra. See 
also Oswald, Durham and Bates, Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operations 35 on the status of FPUs.  
7 The Special Committee was established by the General Assembly (UNGA) in 1965 to undertake a 
comprehensive review of all issues relating to UN peacekeeping and to report on those to it. It consists of 147 
member States, mainly past or current troop-contributors. Fourteen additional UN member States and some 
3 
 
main actors was clear from the beginning: the UN considered FPU officers, like other 
CIVPOL personnel, as experts on mission for the Organization, protected by immunities 
ratione materiae but in certain cases subject to host State criminal jurisdiction. In contrast, the 
C-34 emphasized similarities with MMsNCs and insisted on granting PCCs exclusive 
criminal jurisdiction over FPU officers (and in fact over CIVPOL personnel in general).  
This struggle resulted in some significant changes, and the official position moved 
back and forth. In addition, information published and legal documents and reports adopted 
by various UN organs and bodies have not always been up-to-date or accurate in terms of 
their position on these issues.8 As a result, a quick review of existing UN materials may blur 
the already unclear picture even further. The effect: uncertainty and ambiguity, to the extent 
that in the past over a decade it may at times have proven somewhat of a challenge to come to 
a correct conclusion regarding the legal status and criminal accountability of FPU officers.9  
However, these issues are not inconsequential: not only do FPU officers constitute a 
considerable share of all UN field personnel (with over 10,000 individuals!)10, they are also 
implicated in a significant percentage of recent accusations of sexual exploitation and abuse 
(SEA)11 allegedly involving UN mission personnel.12 In addition, these issues gain additional 
                                                                                                                                                        
intergovernmental organizations and entities, including regional organizations as well as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and the International Criminal Police Organization, participate as observers. 
(<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ctte/CTTEE.htm>) 
8 For instance, the DPKO/Department of Field Support (DFS) Civil Affairs Handbook (UN 2012) Ref. 2012.02, 
43) distinguishes between IPOs, “who are ‘experts on mission’ and generally unarmed” (emphasis added) and 
(armed) FPUs. The distinction gives the impression that FPU members are not experts on mission. In contrast, 
the DPKO, Police Division ‘Guidelines for Formed Police Units on Assignment with Peace Operations’ (8 May 
2006) UN Doc DPKO/PD/2006/00015, paras. 14 and 30) clearly confirm the status of members of FPUs as 
experts on mission and the applicability of relevant immunities to them, even recognizing the right of the host 
State to exercise criminal jurisdiction over them. The inconsistency between these publications cannot be 
explained with reference to legal developments between 2006 and 2012. See Sections IV.2.-IV.3, infra.  
In addition, whereas the 2006 ‘Guidelines for Formed Police Units on Assignment with Peace 
Operations’ 7, n. 3, refer – discussing disciplinary matters – to the fact that the ‘Directives for Disciplinary 
Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’ had been amended to apply to FPUs, it does 
not alert the reader to this fact in its Annex 11 (containing the original text of the Directives which denied the 
applicability of this instrument to members of FPUs). On these amendments, see text accompanying notes 109-
110, infra. 
Similarly, the website of the UN’s Conduct and Discipline Unit still contains a version of the 
‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’ prior to its 2005 
amendment (<https://cdu.unlb.org/Portals/0/PdfFiles/PolicyDocG.pdf>). See also notes 149-150 and 
accompanying text, infra, on the failure within the UN and of other relevant actors to note relevant changes and 
to update information. 
9 For instance, a fact sheet on ‘Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations’ published by the Code Blue 
Campaign ((13 May 2005) <http://www.codebluecampaign.com/fact-sheets-materials/2015/5/13/immunity>) 
states that “[w]hile UN documents are not entirely clear, our research indicates that both Formed Police Units 
and UN civilian police are classified as Experts on Mission” (emphasis added). Code Blue is an influential civil 
society project. It repeatedly attracted the attention of international media in the past year, pressing for more 
transparency concerning and accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse committed by UN peacekeepers. 
10 See UNPOL website. 
11 According to statistics presented by the UN Secretary-General, SEA-related accusations received against FPU 
officers amounted to 7,2 % of all such accusations (5 of 69) in 2015 (UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General: 
Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse’ (16 February 2016) UN Doc 
A/70/729 (hereinafter Secretary-General ‘Special Measures Report’ 2016)), whereas FPUs constituted about 
eight percent of all UN peacekeeping personnel (see sources cited in note 3, supra, cf. text accompanying note 
20, infra). 
12 In the past decades, SEA has become a major problem in UN peacekeeping, affecting the credibility of the 
UN. The fight against SEA in UN missions has thus featured high on international agenda’s and the UN has been 
attempting to tackle the problem for over a decade. For further information on this issue, see, e.g. 




importance now, at a moment that exclusive TCC criminal jurisdiction over MMsNCs 
becomes drawn into question even in UN circles.13 For these reasons, this article aims to 
clarify the current status of members of FPUs as well as the rules governing their criminal 
accountability and to assess the likelihood of change. To provide for a better understanding of 
the presently unambiguous legal situation, we will approach these issues through the looking 
glass of the developments that have led to the current status quo.  
The study will start out with a short description of UN (civilian) police and FPUs, 
paying attention to their origins, tasks and main characteristics. Next, it will provide a brief 
overview of the original rules concerning the legal status, privileges and immunities, and 
criminal accountability of CIVPOL (experts on mission for the UN), MMsNCs and FPU 
officers in broad lines. The main body of the article examines the struggle between the C-34 
and the UN (Secretariat), both sturdy in their respective views and sentiments. Through 
presenting both positions and relevant developments, the author offers gradually to clarify the 
central issues of this study: the status and criminal accountability of FPU officers. The last 
substantive section addresses the likelihood that the current status quo represents a final 
solution. The article concludes with a summary of the findings and presents some lessons 
learned and implications for the criminal accountability of MMsNCs. 
 
 
II. From CIVPOL to UNPOL and the Birth of FPUs 
 
The first civilian14 police officers were deployed by the UN in the United Nations Operation 
in the Congo between 1960-1964.15  
In the early days, they were  
 
to undertake the supervision or control of local civil police in order to ensure 
that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially, and that the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected.16 
 
Over the decades, their tasks evolved, “from monitoring and advising functions to 
reforming, restructuring and institution building of local police services and performing 
executive law enforcement”.17 In addition, UN police may be involved in election monitoring 
and assisting humanitarian agencies.18 
                                                 
13 See text accompanying notes 171-172, infra. 
14 The specific reference here to the “civilian” nature of such personnel distinguishes these individuals from 
“military police”. The latter category serves in UN peacekeeping missions with the aim to “police the premises” 
of the mission and “to maintain discipline and order” among its members (UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-
General: Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peace-Keeping Operations’ (9 October 1990) UN Doc 
A/45/594, Annex (hereinafter Model SOFA), para. 40, see also ibid., para. 41). The tasks of “military police” are 
thus centered within, rather than outside the mission. Unless specifically stated otherwise, references in this 
study to (UN) police personnel concern civilian police. 
15 DPKO Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (UN 2003) 84; UNGA 
‘Report of the Secretary-General: United Nations police’ (15 December 2011) UN Doc A/66/615, para. 9. 
However, the ‘Agreement between the United Nations and the Republic of the Congo relating to the Legal 
Status, Facilities, Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations Organization in the Congo’ (27 November 
1961) UN Doc A/4986-S/5004 and the ‘Regulations for the United Nations Force in the Congo’ (15 July 1963) 
UN Doc ST/SGB/ONUC/1 do not specifically mention UN civilian police.  
16 DPKO United Nations Civilian Police Handbook (UN 1995) 9-10. 
17 DPKO Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations 83. See also UNSC Res 
2185 (2014) ‘United Nations Police’ (20 November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2185 (2014), preambular para. 12. 
For more detailed information on these tasks, see DPKO/DFS ‘Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping 
Operations and Special Political Missions’ (1 February 2014) Ref. 2014.01 12-20. 
18 DPKO United Nations Civilian Police Handbook 31. 
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Corresponding to their broadening and increasingly complex tasks, police personnel 
constitutes the “fastest growing component within United Nations peacekeeping 
operations.”19 A major part of this growth is attributable to FPUs: at the time of writing, 71 
units were deployed, involving over 10,000 FPU officers.20  
Their extensive deployment and crucial contribution to UN peacekeeping have led to 
calls for a more professional attitude to UN police matters, from recruitment to implementing 
assignments.21 To emphasize the shift in their functions and to provide them with a new 
image, even the name was changed from UN civilian police (or CIVPOL) to UN Police 
(UNPOL) in 2005.22 Yet, many UN documents and instruments governing, for instance, their 
legal status or disciplinary matters still refer to “civilian police”, probably as a factual 
description.23 In addition, it is clear that – at least with regard to suitable equipment, training 
and selection – there is still room within UNPOL for improvement.24  
Even more relevantly for the present study, UN practice related to the utilization of 
police personnel underwent a significant relatively recent change. Whereas initially all police 
officers were seconded individually, since 1999 the Organization has increasingly deployed, 
next to individual police officers, also Formed Police Units.25  
 
FPUs have three core tasks: public order management, protection of United 
Nations personnel and facilities, and support for police operations that may 
involve a higher risk above the general capability of an IPO.26  
 
FPUs are “cohesive mobile police units”,27 consisting of about 120-140 officers of one 
nationality.28 Their members, like IPOs, are active or retired police officers in their home 
                                                 
19 A-M. Orler, ‘Professionalising United Nations Police In Peacekeeping: Vision for the Police Division and 
United Nations Police in Peacekeeping’ (September 2010) 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/unpol_vision.pdf>. For exact participation figures 
(past and present), see ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ fact sheets. 
20 See UN Police website on FPUs. 
21 Orler, ‘Professionalising United Nations Police In Peacekeeping’. The importance of UN Police, their 
significant contribution to UN peacekeeping, their growth and increasing diversification were recently 
acknowledged even by the Security Council (see UNSC Res 2185 ‘United Nations Police’ Preamble). 
22 See <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/new_identity.shtml>.  
23 E.g. para. 26 Model SOFA; ‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and 
Military Observers’. See also note 14, supra on the distinction between civilian and military police. 
24 See e.g. UNSC Res 2185 ‘United Nations Police’ preambular para. 16; paras. 3 and 31; UNGA ‘United Nation 
police’ paras. 62, 67; H.F. Johnson, ‘Capacity to Protect Civilians: Rhetoric or Reality?’ Challenges Forum, 
Policy Brief 2015:4 <http://www.challengesforum.org/en/Reports--Publications/CF/POLICY-BRIEF-20154/> 9; 
UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General: The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the 
recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations’ (2 September 2015) UN Doc 
A/70/357-S/2015/682, paras. 93 and 24. 
25 The first FPUs were deployed within the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). See UN Police website on FPUs. Both missions were 
deployed without a status of forces agreement (see e.g. I. Ingravallo, ‘UN Territorial Administrations: Between 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ in R. Kolb and G. Gaggioli (eds), Research Handbook 
on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Elgar 2013) 391, 411 n. 97), hence it is not possible to identify the 
status and criminal accountability of FPU officers specifically in these contexts based on such agreements.  
It may be noted that a third – relatively minor – category of UNPOL personnel serve as UN staff 
members. See ‘United Nations Police Selection and Recruitment Kit’ <http://womenspolicenetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/UNPOL-Selection-and-Recruitment-Kit-September-2012_web.pdf> Preface 3. 
26 ‘United Nations Police Selection and Recruitment Kit’ Preface 3, para. 20, footnote omitted. See also 
DPKO/DFS ‘Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (revised) (2010) Ref. 
2009.32, para. 12. 
27 DPKO/DFS ‘Guidelines on Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special 
Political Missions’ (2015) Ref. 2015.15 25.  
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countries, contributed by member States to the United Nations at the Secretary-General’s 
request.29  
The rules and practices related to their secondment to the UN follow a pattern 
representing a mixture between those utilized in relation to IPOs (and in general UN experts 
on mission) on the one hand, and to MMsNCs on the other. First, FPU officers do not sign a 
contract with the UN. Like MMsNCs but in contrast to IPOs30, they are not contracted or 
seconded individually to the UN by the seconding State. Rather, they are contributed in units 
under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)31 concluded between the UN and the PCC.32  
In addition, like MMsNCs, FPU members are armed and may have enforcement 
capacities and executive mandates.33 These facts evidence a significant parallel with 
MMsNCs. It should however be noted that although CIVPOL34 and in particular FPU 
personnel bear (light) arms35 and “are equipped to convey a stronger presence than a 
collection of individual police officers”, “they seldom have the power to arrest or enforce”.36 
In other words, FPU officers should be “capable of handling an escalating security situation, 
where, for example, a demonstration turns violent, but FPUs are not an extension of the 
military peacekeepers”.37 Moreover, executive task are exceptional today.38  
                                                                                                                                                        
28 ‘Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, paras. 20-21; UN Peacekeeping 
PDT Standards, Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (1st ed., 2009) Unit 2 
<http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Download.aspx?docid=936> 52; 
DPKO/DFS Civil Affairs Handbook 43. 
29 UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards 52; 2006 ‘Guidelines for Formed Police Units on Assignment with Peace 
Operations’ 5, para. 14 (specifically in relation to members of FPUs). H.F. Johnson, A. Wafy, M. Kroeker, J. 
Rauch, B. Ahmed and S. Rumin ‘External Review of the Functions, Structure and Capacity of the UN Police 
Division’ (31 May 2016) < http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/policereview2016.pdf>, para. 165. 
30 See e.g. ‘Guidelines on Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political 
Missions’ 7, para. 20. 
31 On these agreements, see briefly Section III.1., infra, and Zs. Deen-Racsmány, ‘The Amended UN Model 
Memorandum of Understanding: A New Incentive for States to Discipline and Prosecute Military Members of 
National Peacekeeping Contingents?’ (2011) 16 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 321. 
32 ‘Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ para. 9. Until recently, a single 
model MOU was used for contributing military contingents and FPUs. See, however, Section IV.4, infra on 
relevant recent amendments 
33 See DPKO, United Nations Police Handbook (UN 2005) 41-42. See also para. 37 Model SOFA. 
34 The C-34 has repeatedly emphasized in relation to the entire category of UN civilian police that they may need 
to carry out executive mandates similar to those assigned to MMsNCs. However, such tasks appear to have been 
reserved for FPUs. See Sebastián, The Role of Police in UN Peace Operations: Filling the Gap in the Protection 
of Civilians From Physical Violence 21-22 and 49 n. 76. Indeed, the first instances of CIVPOL personnel being 
mandated executive functions concerned the first deployments of FPUs (in UNMIK and UNTAET) and few such 
mandates followed. See note 25, supra and note 38, infra. 
35 Sebastián, The Role of Police in UN Peace Operations: Filling the Gap in the Protection of Civilians From 
Physical Violence 12. 
36 H.P. Langille, Improving United Nations Capacity for Rapid Deployment (International Peace Institute, 
October 2014) <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-
content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_improving_un_rapid_deployment.pdf> 7-8. 
37 A.S. Hansen, ‘Policing the Peace: The Rise of United Nations Formed Police Units’ ZIF Policy Briefing (May 
2011) Berlin: Centre for International Peace Operations 2. 
38 As noted by Sebastián,  
 
[s]ince the experiences in Kosovo and Timor Leste, executive mandates have been rarely 
authorized as a result of political sensitivities about host-state sovereignty and the operational 
challenges associated with this kind of mandate for UN police. 
  
Sebastián, The Role of Police in UN Peace Operations: Filling the Gap in the Protection of Civilians From 
Physical Violence 9 see also ibid., 10, 21-22, 49 n. 76 and DPKO, United Nations Police Handbook 51. On the 
complexity of problems raised by executive mandates, see e.g. DKPO, United Nations Civilian Police Principles 
and Guidelines (UN 2000) 
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On the other hand, there are some significant dissimilarities between FPU officers and 
MMsNCs. First, FPUs are administratively clearly separated from national military 
contingents in terms of structure and chain of command: FPUs (like other UNPOL personnel) 
are not part of the military component of the operation to which they are assigned. Instead, 
they (together with IPOs) form a separate (police) component, headed by the Head of Police 
Components.39 These features emphasize that, unlike MMsNCs, FPU officers constitute non-
military (i.e. civilian) personnel, more readily associated with IPOs.  
Secondly, and even more importantly, unlike MMsNCs, members of FPUs sign a 
letter of undertaking upon being assigned to a UN mission which is identical to the 
declaration signed by IPOs and by other UN experts on mission.40 Significantly, they inter 
alia declare41 to comply with the ‘Regulations Governing the Status, Basic Rights and Duties 
of Officials other than Secretariat Officials, and Experts on Mission’.42 These facts in turn 
suggest that, in terms of their status, FPU officers should be assimilated to IPOs and to other 
UN experts on mission.  
The relevant implications of these features (specifically in relation to criminal 
accountability) and the status and criminal accountability of FPU personnel in general will be 
explored in the next sections. 
 
 
III.  The Initial Status and Criminal Accountability of FPU Officers  
 
1. Background: Status and Criminal Accountability of Related Personnel Categories 
The introduction of the first formed police units was not preceded by nor did it immediately 
lead to amendments of the relevant legal texts. As a consequence, applicable legal instruments 
did (and some even today do) not (explicitly) address the status and criminal accountability of 
FPU officers in particular. We may, however, look at the regulation of these issues in relation 
to other personnel categories for guidance concerning the initial legal situation.  
For reasons explained above, the controversy concerning the status and criminal 
accountability of FPU officers relates to the question whether, as UN civilian police officers, 
they should be treated as UN experts on mission, or can or should rather be assimilated to 
military members of national contingents. It thus appears useful to consider the position of 
and relevant rules applicable to these two personnel categories in particular as a background, 
while highlighting also some general issues in relation to the regulation of the status of 
personnel in UN missions.  
                                                                                                                                                        
<http://www.navedu.navy.mi.th/stg/databasestory/data/laukniyom/workjob/bigcountry-workjob/UN-
Publications/066-un_ciivpol_principles_and_guidelines%20.pdf> 4-5, 16-29, 48, 53-56. 
 On the other hand, the 2016 external UNPOL review complained of the problem of “[m]ilitary control 
and militarization of United Nations police components” (Johnson ‘External Review of the Functions, Structure 
and Capacity of the UN Police Division’, para. 64, see also ibid., para. 63), but it is unclear if this criticism also 
relates to FPU/UNPOL mandates or only to the means at their disposal and the ways they are deployed.  
39 ‘Guidelines on Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions’ 
paras. 20-21 and ‘Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ 10, paras. 8 and 
46. Even in the DPKO, the overall responsibility over civilian police activities is vested with a separate unit, the 
United Nations Police Division (part of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, created in 2007). See 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/division.shtml>; 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/unpol_visual_identifier_guidelines.pdf> 12. 
40 See 2006 ‘Guidelines for Formed Police Units on Assignment with Peace Operations’ Annex 3. Compare to 
DPKO, Police Division, ‘Guidelines for United Nations Police Officers on Assignment with Peacekeeping 
Operations’ (29 June 2007) UN Doc DPKO/PD/2006/00135 Annex 3. 
41 2006 ‘Guidelines for Formed Police Units on Assignment with Peace Operations’ Annex 3, para. 2.  
42 UNSG ‘Secretary-General’s Bulletin (18 June 2002) Regulations Governing the Status, Basic Rights and 
Duties of Officials other than Secretariat Officials, and Experts on Mission’ [2002] UN Doc ST/SGB/2002/9. 
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UN peacekeeping operations are as a rule stationed in the host State under a status of 
forces agreement (SOFA) concluded between that State and the UN.43 Building on extensive 
practice, the UNGA adopted a model SOFA in 199044 containing the rules commonly 
contained in existing SOFAs. Subsequent status agreements are modelled after this 
instrument, although deviations from model provisions do occur.  
SOFAs explicitly lay down rules concerning inter alia the status of and facilities for 
the operation and regulate the legal status, privileges and immunities of the following 
personnel: high ranking UN personnel (including the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General, the head of military component and the head of police component), UN civilian staff, 
experts on mission (including e.g. military observers and CIVPOL/UNPOL), MMsNCs and 
locally recruited personnel.45 Members of FPUs (not yet utilized at the time when that 
instrument was drafted) are not as such mentioned in the Model SOFA, and the other 
personnel categories dealt with therein are not defined. However, the instrument does contain 
rules of importance for this study. 
In accordance with the Model SOFA46 and provisions modelled after it, UN civilian 
police enjoy immunities pertaining to experts on mission as provided for in Article VI of the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.47 Most importantly, the 
CPIUN grants experts on mission immunity for official conduct.48 However, as specified in 
SOFAs, most personnel other than MMsNCs (thus also experts on mission including UN 
civilian police) may be subject to investigations by the host Government and UN authorities 
and to local jurisdiction (in the host State) for crimes and misconduct not related to their 
official duties. Additionally, subject to waiver by the Secretary-General, they may even be 
tried in the host State in relation to their official conduct.49  
As for MMsNCs, the Model SOFA specifies that they “shall have the privileges and 
immunities specifically provided for” therein.50 First, it grants such individuals – like all other 
participants of the operations – immunity for official conduct.51 However, it also contains a 
unique rule in relation to this personnel category: MMsNCs are placed under “the exclusive 
jurisdiction of their respective participating States in respect of any criminal offences which 
                                                 
43 In the exceptional cases where it has not been possible to conclude a SOFA prior to deployment, the resolution 
setting up the operation commonly states that the Model SOFA will provisionally apply until the conclusion of 
an actual SOFA. See e.g. Oswald and Bates, ‘Privileges and Immunities of United Nations Police’ 383 and 
Oswald, Durham and Bates, Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operations 34. In addition, according to a legal 
opinion prepared by the UN’s Office of Legal Affairs (hereinafter OLA),  
 
[i]f no status-of-forces agreement has been concluded and the model status-of-forces 
agreement has not been made applicable by the Security Council resolution authorizing the 
operation, then the status of civilian police officers remains governed by the Convention [on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations]. 
 
(‘Letter to the Acting Chair of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, regarding 
immunities of civilian police and military personnel’ 2004 UNJYB 324.) 
44 Model SOFA. 
45 Ibid., paras. 24-28.  
46 Ibid., para. 26. 
47 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (adopted 13 February 1946, entered into 
force 17 September 1946) 1 UNTS 15 (hereinafter CPIUN). 
48 Ibid. Art. VI, Sect. 22(b). See also para. 46 Model SOFA. In addition, the CPIUN (Art. VI, Sect. 22(a)) grants 
experts immunity from personal arrest and detention. See also para. 42 Model SOFA on rules concerning taking 
into custody. 
49 Paras. 42-45 and 47(a) Model SOFA. 
50 Ibid., para. 27. 
51 Ibid., para. 46. 
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may be committed by them” in the host State.52 Unlike UN civilian police, they may thus 
under no circumstances be subjected to host State criminal jurisdiction for such conduct. 
A different type of agreements, memoranda of understanding, constitute an additional 
potential source of relevant rules. Such agreements are concluded between the UN and the 
contributing State, regulating the contribution by an individual member State of personnel and 
equipment to a specific UN operation. Like SOFAs, MOUs are drafted based on a model 
instrument. This model instrument underwent frequent changes in the past decades.53  
As they only deal with the contribution of contingents (rather than individually 
seconded personnel such as IPOs), within UNPOL, MOUs may only be of relevance for FPU 
officers. However, prior to 2007, the Model MOU did not specifically mention this category 
and even thereafter it was long silent on the criminal accountability of members of FPUs.54  
On the other hand, such agreements have become central to discussing the criminal 
accountability of MMsNCs. MOUs following the current model agreement regulate inter alia 
issues of (discipline and) criminal jurisdiction. Most significantly, they confirm the SOFA 
arrangements on exclusive TCC jurisdiction, specifically over military and certain civilian 
members of the national contingent “while they are assigned to the military component” of 
the given operation.55  
However, it is more important at this point that from 1997 to 2007 (thus also in the 
first years of the existence of FPUs), the model agreement (and actual agreements based on 
the model instrument) did not contain such provisions.56 Accordingly, in this period, MOUs 
did not even affect the criminal accountability of MMsNCs or other peacekeeping personnel.  
                                                 
52 Ibid., para. 47(b). 
53 Its current version is reproduced as ‘Memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and 
[participating State] contributing resources to [the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation]’ in UNGA ‘Manual 
on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of 
Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual)’ (20 January 2015) UN Doc 
A/C.5/69/18 185 (hereinafter Model MOU (2014)). It should be noted that the present article contains references 
to various (previous) versions of this document. The year denoting a specific version will be specified only if the 
provision discussed is unique to that version or if this information is otherwise relevant.) 
54 For the version reflecting the 2007 amendments, see ‘Memorandum of understanding between the United 
Nations and [participating State] contributing resources to [the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation]’ in 
UNGA ‘Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned 
Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual)’ (29 January 
2009) UN Doc A/C.5/63/18 161 (hereinafter Model MOU (2007)). 
55 Art 7.22 Model MOU (2014). This provision is identical to Art. 7.22 Model MOU (2007). 
56 In 2007, the Model MOU underwent substantive amendments in an attempt to ensure the criminal 
accountability of MMsNCs. On these amendments see e.g. Deen-Racsmány, ‘The Amended UN Model 
Memorandum of Understanding’ 321. See also ibid. 329-331 on the amendments between 1991 and 1997. It 
may, however, be noted that the first version of this instrument (UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General: 
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-keeping Operations in All Their Aspects: Model 
Agreement between the UN and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to UN Peace-keeping 
Operations’ (23 May 1991) UN Doc A/46/185 Annex, paras. 5 and 24-25) indirectly recognized the exclusive 
jurisdiction of TCCs over MMsNCs by confirming the privileges and immunities of (military and civilian) 
personnel provided by the TCC and jurisdictional arrangements as specified in the SOFA. However, this 
provision (or any other regulation of criminal accountability) did not (re)appear in the newly drafted 1996 model 
agreement (UNGA ‘Note by the Secretary-General: Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of 
the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Reform 
of the Procedures for Determining Reimbursement to Member States for Contingent-owned Equipment’ (9 July 
1996) UN Doc A/50/995 Annex (‘Contribution Agreement between the United Nations and [Participating State] 
Contributing Resources to [the United Nations Peace-keeping Operation]’)), nor in its 1997 version (UNGA 
‘Note by the Secretary-General: Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Reform of the Procedures 
for Determining Reimbursement to Member States for Contingent-owned Equipment’ (27 August 1997) UN Doc 
A/51/967 Annex (‘Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and [Participating State] 
Contributing Resources to [the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation]’) (hereinafter Model MOU (1997)). 
10 
 
In the absence of relevant rules in MOUs or elsewhere, SOFA exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction arrangements prevailed: the UN and the host State were at no times entitled to 
subject MMsNCs to disciplinary or criminal proceedings. From 2003, this idea was also 
confirmed in the ‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Military Members of National 
Contingents’.57 The sole relevant competence of the UN recognized by these Directives is an 
administrative sanction: repatriation.58 
In turn, in relation to UN civilian police, the UN’s disciplinary authority and related 
procedures have – since 2003 – been regulated in the ‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters 
Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’. In contrast to the ‘Directives for 
Disciplinary Matters Involving Military Members of National Contingents’ these directives, 
applicable to certain categories of experts on mission whose status as experts on mission is 
explicitly recognized therein,59 confirms the authority of the host State to conduct criminal 
proceedings60 and of the UN to investigate the conduct of and impose disciplinary measures 
over such personnel61 in addition to the possibility of national disciplinary proceedings.62 
The Organization’s disciplinary authority over UN civilian police is consistent with 
the undertaking made by such personnel63 and the fact that they declare to be bound by the 
‘Regulations Governing the Status, Basic Rights and Duties of Officials other than Secretariat 
Officials, and Experts on Mission’.64 Significantly, flowing from this status and in accordance 
with these regulations, experts on mission (unlike MMsNCs) are directly accountable to the 
UN in relation to the exercise of their functions.65  
We can thus conclude that there were significant differences between the regulation of 
criminal and disciplinary authority over MMsNCs on the one hand and civilian police officers 
(experts on mission) on the other in the examined period. 
 
2. Implications for the Status and Criminal Accountability of Members of FPUs 
It should be recalled that neither the Model SOFA, nor the version of the Model MOU in use 
at the time of the introduction of FPUs (1999) explicitly mention FPU officers. Following the 
UN terminology prevailing at the time, the Model SOFA, provides in general terms merely 
that “UN civilian police” participating in the operation shall have the status of experts on 
mission for the UN.66 Whereas in actual SOFAs this model provision is regularly expanded to 
cover additional categories of experts on mission, initially SOFAs under which FPUs were 
deployed did not literally refer to FPUs (or to IPOs).67  
                                                 
57 UN Doc DPKO/MD/03/00993 (2003), paras. 8, 28. 
58 Ibid., paras. 16 and 24. 
59 ‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’, para. 8. See 
however note 74, infra, on the exclusion of FPU officers. 
60 Ibid., paras. 8 and 28. 
61 Ibid., paras. 11-14 (see also paras. 15-22 on Board of Inquiry proceedings) and para. 23, respectively. It may 
be noted that the UN does not have the authority or capacity to exercise criminal jurisdiction over (any of) its 
personnel. 
62 Ibid., para. 24. 
63 See note 40, supra and accompanying text. 
64 UNSG ‘Secretary-General’s Bulletin (18 June 2002) Regulations Governing the Status, Basic Rights and 
Duties of Officials other than Secretariat Officials, and Experts on Mission’. 
65 Ibid., Regulation 3. 
66 Para. 26 Model SOFA. On the use of this term see note 14, supra. 
67 Of the operations with FPUs (see list at the UN Police website on FPUs), for instance the following SOFAs do 
not refer to FPU officers: Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of Côte 
d’Ivoire regarding the status of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (Abidjan, 29 June 2004) 2268 
UNTS 40393 161, para. 28; Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the 
Republic of South Sudan (with supplemental arrangement) (Juba, 8 August 2011) UNTS 48873 
<http://unmiss.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=gpHXyf3LQ0k%3D&tabid=5100&language=ar-JO>, 
para. 28; Agreement between Liberia and the United Nations concerning the status of the United Nations 
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Yet, there is no doubt that FPU officers are and were seen as UN (civilian) police. 
Accordingly, while not specifically stated so, in the absence of distinctions in applicable 
SOFA provisions and of other relevant norms which could affect the status of FPU officers in 
particular, a literal interpretation of applicable rules leads to the conclusion that FPU officers 
were too meant to be treated as experts on mission even under such (earlier) SOFAs. In this 
sense, the initial lack of specific references may be taken to evidence that it was apparently 
not considered necessary to deviate from existing norms following the introduction of FPUs; 
FPU officers could simply be accommodated in the category of civilian police. Hence, all 
SOFA rules applicable to civilian police should also apply to them. This reading is confirmed 
by recent SOFAs which refer in relevant provisions to “UN civilian police, including 
members of formed police units”.68 
Consistently with this position, the suggested parallel with MMsNCs is denied – at 
least in legal terms – by a closer look at the relevant SOFA provisions on MMsNCs. The 
model provision on criminal jurisdiction over such personnel (subjecting them to exclusive 
TCC jurisdiction) contains a crucial phrase, referring specifically to “[m]ilitary members of 
the military component”.69 As FPU officers are not part of the military component,70 this 
provision cannot be read as applicable to such personnel.  
In turn, MOUs concluded at the time of the introduction of FPUs had no impact on the 
status and accountability of FPU officers.71 In addition, while MOUs modelled after the 2007 
version do address the question of criminal jurisdiction in relation to MMsNCs, the 
applicability of the relevant provision to FPUs appears to be negated by the qualification 
“while they are assigned to the military component” of the given operation.72 
The conclusion that FPU officers are to be treated as UN civilian police, hence experts 
on mission, thus appears unchallenged by these instruments. Consequently, and in line with 
the undertakings and declaration made by FPUs (identical to version for IPOs)73, it would 
appear that FPU officers too may be subject, next to host State criminal jurisdiction, to the 
disciplinary authority of the UN.  
Somewhat surprisingly in light of this seemingly neat legal regime, the 2003 
‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military 
Observers’ explicitly excluded FPU officers from the scope of its coverage, placing 
responsibility for disciplinary action in respect of them with the national unit commanders.74 
                                                                                                                                                        
Mission in Liberia (Monrovia, 6 November 2003) 2300 UNTS 41006 127, para. 28; Agreement between the 
United Nations and the Government of Haiti concerning the status of the United Nations Operation in Haiti 
(Port-au-Prince, 9 July 2004) 2271 UNTS 40460 235, para. 28.  
68 See e.g. Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Central African 
Republic relating to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African 
Republic (Bangui, 2 September 2014) UNTS 52177, para. 29 and Status of Forces Agreement between the 
United Nations and the Government of the Republic of Mali concerning the United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Bamako, 1 July 2013) UNTS 51015, para 28. 
69 Para. 47(b) Model SOFA. 
70 See text accompanying note 39, supra. 
71 It may be noted that there is some ambiguity as to which model was in use from 1999 (the deployment of the 
first FPUs) to 2007. See Deen-Racsmány, ‘The Amended UN Model Memorandum of Understanding’ 330, n. 
44. However, this question is immaterial as none of the claimed versions contained relevant provisions. See note 
56, supra and accompanying text. 
72 Art. 7.22 Model MOU (2007). See text accompanying note 39, supra. 
73 See notes 40-41, supra and accompanying text. 
74 ‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’, original 
version (prior to 2005 amendments) <https://cdu.unlb.org/Portals/0/PdfFiles/PolicyDocG.pdf> n. 1, stating that 
  
[t]hese Directives shall not be applicable to members of national formed police units. 
Responsibility for disciplinary action in these units rests with the commanders of the national 
units, who must keep the Head of Mission fully informed in all disciplinary matters.  
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In terms of their disciplinary and criminal accountability, FPU officers were hereby explicitly 
divorced from IPOs and other experts on mission participating in UN peacekeeping 
operations, and placed rather on a footing similar to MMsNCs (although they were not 
explicitly covered by the ‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Military Members of 
National Contingents’ either75). The ‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian 
Police Officers and Military Observers’ thus clearly blurred the initially clear legal picture, 
demonstrating that the position of FPU officers is less than unambiguous. Opposing views 
concerning this issue and relevant developments – leading to the adoption of the Directives 
and subsequent to those – will be explored in the next section. 
 
 
IV. UN (Secretariat) versus PCCs (Members of the C-34): Gradual Clarification of 
the Position of FPU Officers 
 
As evidenced by the reports of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the legal 
position and criminal accountability of FPU officers (and indeed of UN civilian police as a 
whole) have been contentious ever since such units were first deployed. A protracted dispute 
between the C-34 and the UN Secretariat apparently triggered a gradual clarification of these 
issues, through amendments of rules if necessary, contributing to consensus.  
A detailed study of this process presented below can thus enhance our understanding 
of the current status quo and of the likelihood of future change on these matters. In addition, a 
review of relevant developments may provide valuable insights concerning the attitude of 
troop and police contributors towards criminal accountability in UN peacekeeping operations 
in general. 
 
1.  1999-2005: Opposing Positions Crystallize 
It is a widely recognized that UN peacekeeping entered a new phase following the end of the 
Cold War. It is, however, perhaps less well known that this change also had a significant 
impact on the tasks of UN civilian police, leading to the introduction of FPUs with executive 
mandates.76 The Special Committee followed these developments with concern, alerting 
already in 1999 that “in conducting a peacekeeping operation, care should be taken to ensure 
that, consistent with the mandate, police and military tasks should be clearly differentiated.”77 
In subsequent years, members of the Committee repeatedly called for the development of 
guidelines on general principles concerning the role of CIVPOL, stressing the need to 
distinguish between military and police action on each occasion.78 In 2000, the Secretary-
General even referred in this context to the need to reach a political consensus, demonstrating 
the delicacy of the then prevailing situation.79 In addition, the Committee warned that 
“potentially dangerous situations [were] likely to be encountered by [CIVPOL] personnel in 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
See, however, Section IV.2., infra, on relevant amendments. 
75 On this issue, see note 89, infra and accompanying text. 
76 See text accompanying notes 17-29, supra. 
77 UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Comprehensive review of the whole 
question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects’ (23 June 1999) UN Doc A/54/87, para. 100. 
78 UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Comprehensive review of the whole 
question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects’ (20 March 2000) UN Doc A/54/839, para. 34 (see also 
ibid., paras. 131-132); UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Comprehensive 
review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects’ (4 December 2000) UN Doc 
A/C.4/55/6, para 25.  
79 UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Comprehensive review of the whole 
question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects’ (20 March 2000), para. 12. 
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the performance of their duties”, emphasizing the need to adjust rules of engagement for 
CIVPOL – “mandated and required to carry arms” – to this reality.80 These concerns were 
undoubtedly at least in part inspired by the invention of FPUs and the broadened, more robust 
mandates increasingly assigned specifically to such police personnel. 
 In 2000, the DPKO prepared a set of principles and guidelines for CIVPOL81 which 
were welcomed by the C-34. However, this document – confirming the possibility that force 
may be used by CIVPOL personnel and that they may be granted executive powers and 
enforcement mandates82 – apparently invoked more concerns then it removed. As stated in the 
2002 report of the C-34,  
 
[m]any delegations sought clarification as to the legal status of civilian police 
officers serving with the United Nations, considering them part of a national 
contribution rather than individual civilian specialists, and noted that civilian 
police should be repatriated for investigation [hence not subjected to host State 
jurisdiction] in cases of alleged gross misconduct.83  
 
The requested information was provided by the Under-Secretary-General.84  
However, some delegations apparently found the situation as explicated 
unsatisfactory; they called for clarification (again) in 2003.85 This time, the Committee was 
more specific and resolute:  
 
The Special Committee stresse[d] that when civilian police and corrections 
personnel are assigned executive tasks, in which they directly implement law 
and order functions, they may be required to use enforcement measures in 
accordance with their mandates and the rules of engagement. In this regard, the 
Committee request[ed] that the Secretariat consider assigning such personnel 
privileges and immunities equivalent to those of armed military personnel.86 
 
In light of this request, it may come as no surprise that the ‘Directives for Disciplinary 
Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’ issued by the DPKO in 
200387 went a long way to accommodate the position of the C-34 in relation to FPU officers, 
excluding such personnel from the scope of the Directives.88 While the author has not been 
able to identify relevant practice, there are indications that instead of this instrument, the 
‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Military Members of National Contingents’ 
                                                 
80 Ibid., para. 139. 
81 DPKO, United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines. 
82 Ibid. 10, 23, 48-49. 
83 UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Comprehensive review of the whole 
question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects’ (11March 2002) UN Doc A/56/863, para. 43, emphasis 
added. It should be stressed that reference was made here to civilian police, not to FPU officers in particular. 
84 Ibid., Annex II, para. 2. 
85 UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Comprehensive review of the whole 
question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects’ (28 March 2003) UN Doc A/57/767, para. 27. 
86 Ibid., para. 112. Emphases added. 
87 As stated in the Directives (Art. I.1) their aim is “to establish United Nations procedures to be followed for 
alleged breaches of conduct in the mission area” by such personnel. Accordingly, they inter alia build and 
elaborate on SOFA provisions on criminal jurisdiction and specify the UN’s administrative and disciplinary 
authority and related proceedings in relation to specific categories of personnel. 
88 On the relevant provisions of the Directives and specifically on the exclusion of FPU officers, see text 
accompanying notes 60-62 and 74-75, supra, respectively.  
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(building on the principle of exclusive TCC criminal jurisdiction) may have been applied to 
members of FPUs in a subsequent brief period.89  
Yet, the Special Committee was still not satisfied. During its 2004 session, its Acting 
Chair requested “written information regarding immunities of civilian police and military 
personnel” from the Secretariat.90 The Office of Legal Affairs responded – without explicitly 
noting the existence of two distinct categories of civilian police (IPOs and FPUs officers) – 
stressing that such personnel have the status of experts on mission for the UN in the sense of 
Article VI CPIUN, even if no SOFA has been concluded. Accordingly, such personnel are 
granted functional immunity. On the other hand, the opinion continued, 
 
[i]t is … possible and consistent with the [CPIUN and the Model SOFA], that a 
United Nations civilian police officer be prosecuted in the host State for a 
criminal act, even if committed in the course of performing his or her 
functions, where immunity for that act would impede the course of justice and 
that immunity can properly be waived.91 
  
In contrast, in relation to MMsNCs the OLA concluded, citing inter alia paragraph 
47(b) of the Model SOFA92, that they are subject to the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the 
TCC, hence they do not fall under the criminal jurisdiction of the host State. The OLA 
explained this fact (and in turn the difference between the rules applicable to military and 
police personnel) by noting that  
 
[t]his immunity from criminal jurisdiction in a host State can be justified, inter 
alia, by the fact that military personnel, as a rule, are subject to their own 
distinct military judicial system, including for acts committed by them outside 
their own country.93  
 
The OLA thus clearly did not support any parallel between the status and immunities 
of MMsNCs and FPUs, and it even ignored the argument related to possible similarities in 
terms of their tasks. Instead, it focused on the existence of TCC jurisdiction over MMsNCs, 
not addressing this issue in relation to UN civilian police and FPUs in particular.94 
This legal opinion was presented to the C-34 at the same session.95 Some members of 
the Committee apparently found the position adopted by the OLA unsatisfactory and 
                                                 
89 An opinion prepared by the OLA in 2005 stated that “it certainly would not be appropriate to apply, or to 
continue to apply, to members of FPUs the [‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Military Members of 
National Contingents’]”. (‘Note to the Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
concerning Formed Police Units’, UNJYB Special Edition 
<http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../unjuridicalyearbook/pdfs/english/by_chapter/chpVI/legal_opinions/2005.pdf&
lang=E> 2, emphasis added, original italics removed. It should however be stressed that nothing in these 
Directives suggests that members of FPU officers are covered by its provisions. 
90 See OLA, ‘Letter to the Acting Chair of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, 
regarding immunities of civilian police and military personnel’ 323. 
91 Ibid. 324. 
92 See text accompanying note 52, supra. 
93 OLA, ‘Letter to the Acting Chair of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, 
regarding immunities of civilian police and military personnel’ 325.  
94 It may be noted that police officers too are not uncommonly subject to a distinct (police/gendarmerie) code of 
discipline, weakening the distinction made by the OLA. On this issue and related problems see text 
accompanying notes 158-162, infra. 
95 This impression is gained from statements reproduced in UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group at the 2004 substantive session’ (26 March 2004) UN Doc 
A/58/19, paras. 24 and 134. 
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reiterated their concern that civilian police and corrections personnel may need to undertake 
enforcement measures. They called for “an adaptation of the current rules governing their 
legal status” and – again – for equating civilian police to MMsNCs in terms of their privileges 
and immunities.96 In addition, they pressed in strong words for the UN Secretariat to convene 
a meeting with member States (as proposed by the Secretariat in 2003) to discuss the status of 
such personnel.97  
At the Committee’s next session, in 2005, the same concerns and requests regarding 
(an adaptation of) the legal status and privileges and immunities of civilian police were 
repeated, now with specific reference to FPU officers as well.98 However, on this occasion, 
the Special Committee went further than previously,  
 
call[ing] upon the Secretariat to submit a report on the legal status of civilian 
police personnel who are assigned executive tasks, including operational 
recommendations to address the concerns of the Special Committee in an 
appropriate manner, taking into account contributions by Member States and 
the practice of relevant regional organizations.99 
 
 
2. 2005-2007: UN’s Position Is Crystal Clear 
The process called for by the C-34 was interrupted by unexpected developments: the 
revelation of large scale sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers. Following the 
presentation of the Zeid report100 on this issue in 2005 which contained extensive 
recommendations addressed to the UN and member States to tackle this problem, all relevant 
UN bodies and committees concentrated on eliminating SEA in 2005-2007. The C-34 focused 
inter alia on amending the UN Model MOU.101 Yet, even in this period there were some 
developments relevant for this study, possibly also triggered by these events. 
In September 2005, the OLA received two distinct requests for clarification of the 
status of members of FPUs.102 The first concerned the applicability of the ‘Directives for 
Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’ to members 
of FPUs. The other sought inter alia to have the status of members of FPUs as experts on 
mission for the UN confirmed and inquired about the disciplinary regime applicable to them.  
The response of the OLA was categorical, stating in unequivocal terms and with 
specific reference to members of FPUs that they are experts on mission for the UN within the 
meaning of Article VI of the CPIUN and as specified in paragraph 26 of the Model SOFA.103 
The Office added:  
 
This continues to be the case, notwithstanding that the members of an FPU 
may be provided to the United Nations pursuant to a memorandum of 
understanding or agreement concluded by the Organization with the State that 
                                                 
96 Ibid., para. 134. See also ibid., para. 24. 
97 Ibid., para. 134. 
98 UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group at the 2005 
substantive session’ (1 March 2005) UN Doc A/59/19, para. 81. 
99 Ibid., para. 82. 
100 Prince Zeid R.Z. Al-Hussein, ‘A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (24 March 2005) UN Doc A/59/710 (hereinafter Zeid Report). 
101 See UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group’ (2007) 
UN Doc A/61/19/Rev.1 summarizing its work in 2006-2007. 
102 See OLA, ‘Note to the Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, concerning 
Formed Police Units’ 1. The senders of these letters are not made public. 
103 See text accompanying note 46. 
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contributes them, notwithstanding that they may not individually sign any 
agreement, contract or undertaking with the Organization and notwithstanding 
that they may not directly receive any remuneration from the United Nations. 
As the International Court of Justice has observed, an expert on mission may or 
may not have a contract, and may or may not be remunerated. The essence of 
the matter lies not in their administrative position, but in the fact that they have 
been entrusted with, or are performing, a mission for the United Nations. 
Members of FPUs undoubtedly fall within this definition.104 
 
The OLA even explained that the fact that the DPKO has sought waivers of such 
immunities (specified in Article VI of the CPIUN) in relation to members of FPUs and the 
OLA has executed such waivers on behalf of the Secretary-General indicates that this position 
has been applied in practice on several occasions.105 As noted in the opinion, this position was 
communicated to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations earlier in 2005.106 
Turning to the issue of disciplinary regime, the OLA stated that considering the 
contents of a September 2005 Code Cable, 
 
it certainly would not be appropriate to apply, or to continue to apply, to 
members of FPUs the Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Military 
members of National Contingents […]. In particular, members of FPUs are not, 
as supposed by those Directives, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
State contributing them in respect of any criminal offences that they might 
commit in the territory of the State hosting a peacekeeping mission. Rather, as 
is clear from what is said above, they are subject to the criminal jurisdiction of 
the host State: 
 
 - with regard to acts done by them otherwise than in the course of the 
performance of their missions; and  
- with regard to acts done by them in the course of the performance of their 
missions, if the Secretary-General decides to waive the immunity from legal 
process that they enjoy in respect of such acts.107 
 
It was thus (repeatedly) made clear that the UN was of the opinion that PCCs did not 
have exclusive criminal jurisdiction over members of FPUs, nor was it – in the face of 
mounting pressure by troop and police contributors – prepared to grant FPU officers such 
protection. Rather, the OLA opinion even categorically stated that “it would be fully 
appropriate to amend [the ‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police 
Officers and Military Observers’] and to make them applicable to members of FPUs […]”.108 
This position was implemented promptly. Four days after the issuance of this OLA 
opinion, Code Cable 2697 of 7 October 2005 rendered the ‘Directives for Disciplinary 
Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’ applicable to FPU officers 
in all UN peacekeeping operations.109 The Code Cable amended the first sentence of the 
footnote attached to the provision concerning its scope, thus explicitly providing for the 
                                                 
104 OLA, ‘Note to the Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, concerning 
Formed Police Units’ 2. 
105 Ibid. 2. 
106 Ibid. 2. 
107 Ibid. 2-3. Emphases in original.  
108 Ibid. 2. 
109 See 2006 ‘Guidelines for Formed Police Units on Assignment with Peace Operations’ 7, n. 3.  
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application of the Directives to members FPUs. The second sentence of the same footnote 
stating inter alia that “[r]esponsibility for disciplinary action in these units rests with the 
commanders of the national units” was left unaltered.110 
In 2006, the DPKO adopted two documents pressed for by the C-34111, the ‘Policy on 
Functions and Organization of Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations’112 and the ‘Guidelines for Formed Police Units on Assignment with Peace 
Operations’ 113. However, in contrast to the position of the Committee set out in the previous 
section, both these documents treat FPUs as experts on mission, and attribute the usual 
consequences (i.e. those pertaining also to IPOs) of this status to them in terms of immunities, 
the permissibility of host State jurisdiction, and disciplinary matters.114 
In light of these developments, it barely came as a surprise that the amended Model 
MOU adopted in 2007115 does not equate members of FPUs to MMsNCs. While a model 
provision confirms the TCC’s exclusive criminal jurisdiction over “[m]ilitary members and 
any civilian members subject to national military law of the national contingent provided by 
the Government”, it restricts this right to the duration of the assignment of such personnel “to 
the military component”.116 Considering that FPUs form part of the police rather than of the 
military component of UN operations,117 this provision clearly does not apply to them.118 
                                                 
110 Art. II.2 ‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’ 
(current version), n.1. See also the 2003 version for the original formulation. 
111 See UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group at the 
2006 substantive session’ (20 March 2006) UN Doc A/60/19, para. 102. 
112 DPKO, ‘Policy on Functions and Organization of Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations’ (9 November 2006) DPKO/PD/2006/00060 
<https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Policy%20on%20the%20functions%20and%20organization%20of%20For
med%20Police%20Units%20in%20United%20Nations%20Peacekeeping%20Operations.doc>. This document 
is an outdated version of the 2010 ‘Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’. 
113 2006 ‘Guidelines for Formed Police Units on Assignment with Peace Operations’. 
114 Ibid. 5, para. 14; 7, n. 3; 9, para. 30; ‘Policy on Functions and Organization of Formed Police Units in United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ 3, para. 4.6. 
115 Model MOU (2007). It may be noted that the C-34 has participated in the amendment process. See 2007 COE 
Manual containing the Model MOU (2007) 161.  
116 Art. 7.22 Model MOU (2007). See also ibid., Art. 7.23. It may be noted that, in contrast, the provisions of the 
Model MOU (2007) on standards of conduct (7 bis), discipline (7 ter), investigations (7 quarter) and 
accountability (7 sexiens) deal with members of national contingents, without specifically referring to military 
personnel or to military component. 
117 See text accompanying note 39, supra. See to this effect also the Report of the Second Group of Legal 
Experts (hereinafter GLE2): UNGA ‘Report of the Group of Legal Experts on making the standards contained in 
the Secretary-General’s bulletin binding on contingent members and standardizing the norms of conduct so that 
they are applicable to all categories of peacekeeping personnel’ (18 December 2006) UN Doc A/61/645, para. 5 
(hereinafter GLE2 Report) 
118 This conclusion is additionally confirmed by the fact that various provisions of the Model MOU (2007) do 
refer to troop/police contributors, clearly intending to cover also FPUs while recognizing the distinction between 
that group and MMsNCs, whereas Arts. 7.22-7.23 ibid. deal clearly only with military contingents. In addition, it 
may be noted that the GLE2 even specifically stated in its report that members of FPUs, although contributed 
similarly to MMsNCs, do not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the contributing State. GLE2 Report, para. 
5, n. 3.  
Similarly, in a parallel project, the Group of Legal Experts mandated to study the criminal 
accountability of UN officials and experts on mission (hereinafter GLE) noted in relation to FPUs in 2006 that 
 
[t]he members of such units are currently classified as experts on mission and therefore benefit 
from functional immunity. Should their legal status under governing instruments change so 
that they are said to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of their sending State, it is essential 
that these instruments contain provisions to ensure that the sending State is obliged to extend 




Indeed, as indicated by the Secretary-General in his contribution to the amendment 
process, it was clearly not the intention of the UNGA to extend the coverage of the new 
provisions to FPU officers.119 In this light it even appears unlikely that the new MOU rules, 
for instance, on discipline and investigations (containing obligations in relation to members of 
national contingents but without further reference to assignment to the military component) 
are meant to cover FPU officers.120 Accordingly, the 2007 amendments to the Model MOU, 
and the provisions modelled after the Model MOU (2007) in actual agreements (on standards 
of conduct, discipline, investigations, exercise of jurisdiction and accountability), do not seem 
to affect the relevant rights and obligations of member States (PCCs or host) or the UN in 
relation to FPU officers. 
 
 
3. Post 2007: (Reluctant) Acceptance of the Situation by the Special Committee 
Following the adoption of the amended Model MOU in 2007, the C-34 ceased its calls for 
exclusive PCC criminal jurisdiction over FPU officers or UN (civilian) police in general. In 
addition, from 2010 the Committee even kept explicitly acknowledging in its annual report 
“that the role of troops and police, and likewise, the needs of troop-contributing countries and 
police-contributing countries can also be distinct”.121 
                                                                                                                                                        
UNGA ‘Report of the Group of Legal Experts on ensuring the accountability of United Nations staff and experts 
on mission with respect to criminal acts committed in peacekeeping operations’ (16 August 2006) UN Doc 
A/60/980 (hereinafter GLE Report) 9, n. 8, emphasis added. 
119 In a report presenting his amendment proposals (UNGA ‘Note by the Secretary-General: Revised draft model 
memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and [participating State] contributing resources to 
[the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation]’ (3 October 2006) UN Doc A/61/494 3, n.*), the Secretary-
General explicitly noted that  
 
[g]iven that the requests of the General Assembly are limited to revisions to the draft model 
memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and troop-contributing countries 
only, all references in chapter 9 of the COE Manual relating to the contribution of police 
personnel should be disregarded for present purposes. 
 
The version of the Model MOU in use at the time according to the Secretary-General (UN Doc A/C.5/60/26 (22 
December 2005), based on the Model MOU (1997)), to which his amendment proposals refer, did not regulate 
criminal jurisdiction or discipline. 
 The “mandated revisions” referred to by the Secretary-General have their origins in the 
recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (UN Doc A/59/19/Rev.1, Part Two, 
Chapter II, para. 39, cited by the Secretary-General in his report at 1) which in turn build on the Zeid report. 
Most significantly, the C-34 cited paragraphs 71 and 77-79 of the latter report, addressing discipline and exercise 
of criminal jurisdiction in relation to TCCs and MMsNCs only. No parallel recommendations have been 
presented by Prince Zeid in relation to PCCs and FPU officers. The source of the limitation of the scope of 
amendments concerning disciplinary action and criminal jurisdiction to TCCs and MMsNCs thus appears to lie 
in the Zeid report. In endorsing Prince Zeid’s recommendations, the C-34 did not (explicitly) object to this 
restriction. Cf. notes 117-118, supra on relevant statements in the reports of GLE and GLE2. 
 Somewhat peculiarly, in his report presented on 24 March 2005 (about six months before Code Cable 
2697 was issued, see on this development text accompanying note 109, supra) Prince Zeid considered all UN 
police (at the time CIVPOL) officers without distinction as experts on mission, stating that the ‘Directives for 
Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’ (2003 version) were applicable 
to (all) CIVPOL officers. Zeid report, e.g., paras.18, A.14, A.17 A.22. 
120 See note 116, supra. 
121 See e.g. UN Docs. A/64/19 (2010), para. 226; A/65/19 (2011), para. 88; A/66/19 (2012), para. 98 and 
A/68/19 (2014), para. 105. This led the Committee to refer in its reports to “‘troop-contributing countries’ and 
‘police-contributing countries’ singularly or concurrently, depending on the context.” (UNGA ‘Report of the 




Yet, it is still not entirely clear whether the Special Committee really acquiesced in the 
UN’s position. Overall, the statements related to FPUs in the Committee’s yearly reports 
appear admittedly to be consistent with the status of FPU officers as experts on mission (and 
with the provisions of the amended Model MOU (2007) to the extent that those are relevant at 
all).122 Yet, even reports produced after 2007 still contain a few pronouncements which may 
be seen as indications of the old attitude in the C-34. For instance, the 2011 report notes in 
relation to all peacekeeping personnel that  
 
[t]he Special Committee stresses that in the case of any violations of standards, 
appropriate action will be taken within the authority of the Secretary-General, 
while criminal and disciplinary responsibility in respect of members of 
national contingents will depend on the national law of the Member State.123  
 
As noted above, flowing from the position of FPU officers as experts on mission, the 
host State may exercise criminal jurisdiction over such individuals and the UN has some 
(limited) disciplinary powers.124 Hence, this statement appears to be inconsistent with relevant 
legal consequences of the status of members of FPUs.125  
Although not equally clearly problematic, the position adopted in several reports that 
the determination of SEA related misconduct, “for military and police personnel, is based on 
investigations by troop- and police-contributing countries, as stipulated under the revised 
memorandum of understanding”126 is also somewhat controversial. This position is barely 
consistent with the fact that the UN and the host State have the right under SOFAs to conduct 
investigations in relation to accusations against FPU officers.127 In addition, as noted above, it 
appears questionable whether the provisions of the revised model MOU have any relevance 
for investigations by PCCs.128  
At any event, relevant UN documents produced after 2007 confirm the status of FPU 
officers as experts on mission.129  
                                                 
122 The most common recent formulations in C-34 reports are limited to reiterations of the principle that “troop- 
and police-contributing countries bear the primary responsibility for maintaining discipline among their 
contingents deployed in peacekeeping missions”. (UN Docs. A/62/19 (2008), para. 56; A/63/19 (2009), para. 50; 
A/64/19 (2010), para. 50; A/65/19 (2011), para. 48; A/66/19 (2012), para. 54; UNGA ‘Report of the Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 2014 Substantive Session’, para. 60; A/69/19 (2015), para. 62.) Other 
relevant statements concern calls for member States to provide the UN Secretariat with 
 
information on disciplinary actions taken at the national level with respect to substantiated 
cases of misconduct by military and police personnel and improve responsiveness in this 
regard. 
 
UN Doc A/66/19 (2012), para. 58, see also UN Doc A/69/19 (2015), para. 66. 
123 UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 2011 Substantive Session’ UN Doc 
A/65/19 (May 2011), para. 49, emphasis added. 
124 See text accompanying note 73, supra. 
125 Admittedly, the phrase “members of national contingents” may be interpreted to cover only MMsNCs. 
However, this reading is rendered implausible by the reference in the previous paragraph of the same report to 
the responsibility of TCCs and PCCs “for maintaining discipline … among their contingents deployed in 
peacekeeping missions”. UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 2011 
Substantive Session’, para. 48, emphasis added. 
126 UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 2014 Substantive Session’ para. 65. 
127 See notes 49 and 61, supra and accompanying text.  
128 See text accompanying notes 119-120, supra. 
129 See e.g. UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General: Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and 
experts on mission’ (11 August 2008) UN Doc A/63/260, para. 65; UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General: 
Overview of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations: budget performance for the period 





4. 2014 Amendments to the Model MOU: It Can’t Get Any Clearer! 
The consideration of changes to the Model MOU did not terminate upon the adoption of the 
amendments inspired by the SEA scandals in 2007. The Working Group on Contingent-
Owned Equipment continued reviewing the entire system as well as its particular aspects on a 
regular basis – reporting to the Fifth Committee of the UNGA –, together with the Secretary-
General and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.130  
In addition, at least from the early 2010s, the UN Police division was working 
specifically on  
 
updating/strengthening the language in the disciplinary directives for UN 
Police and the Memorandum of Understanding for formed police units with 
clearer provisions on immunity, the applicable legal process, roles and 
responsibilities of the UN and police contributing countries, operating 
procedures on investigations, reporting and handling of evidentiary material.131 
 
While the present author has not been able to trace these processes accurately, it is 
clear that they (presumably together with work conducted by other bodies) have led to 
significant amendments of the Model MOU. Since 2014, that instrument has two generic 
models: one for the contribution of military contingents and a separate one for the 
contribution of FPUs. Even though the generic model for military contingents has undergone 
some changes, relevant provisions (on jurisdiction, discipline, investigations, etc.) are 
unaltered.132  
In contrast, the parallel provisions of the generic model for FPUs contain very 
different rules than those prescribed for MMsNCs, relevant for the present study. First, Article 
7.7 confirms the requirement imposed on members of FPUs to sign the “‘Undertaking and 
Declaration by Experts on Mission’, referring to the United Nations standards of conduct 
[…]”.133  
Secondly, while the first two provisions of Article 7 ter on discipline are nearly 
identical to the rules stated under the same heading in the model for military contingents, 
there are some minor differences.134 In addition, in the FPU version, this section contains two 
additional brief provisions, one relating to pre-deployment training for the Commander of the 
FPU and, even more significantly from our perspective, one explicitly subjecting FPU officers 
“to United Nations procedures for breaches of conduct as set forth in annexes I [‘Guidelines 
for Formed Police Units on Assignment with Peace Operations’] and J [‘Directives for 
Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’].”135 
                                                                                                                                                        
2013) UN Doc A/67/723, para. 131 and DPKO/DFS, ‘Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping 
Operations and Special Political Missions’, para. 22. 
130 These are the only actors listed in the COE Manual (2014) 3-6. However, the available documents adopted in 
recent years by these bodies fall short of explaining the changes related to FPUs to be discussed below. 
131 DPKO, UN Police Magazine (9th ed., July 2012) 12, 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_09.pdf>. 
132 Art. 7 Model MOU (2014), Generic Model for Military Contingents. See however Art. 7 Septies, containing a 
novel provision on Environmental compliance and waste management. 
133 Model MOU (2014), Generic Model for Formed Police Units. 
134 The only significant (and probably barely accidental) deviation is that while the model for FPUs refers to the 
duty of the Government to inform the UN “[…] of any matters involving the discipline and good order of 
members of the unit, including any disciplinary action” (ibid., Art. 7.9, emphasis added), the model for military 
contingents limits this obligation to “any serious matters” (Art. 7.6 Model MOU (2014), Generic Model for 
Military Contingents, emphasis added). 
135 Arts. 7.10-7.11 Model MOU (2014), Generic Model for FPUs. 
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Thirdly, the difference between the corresponding sections of the two generic models 
on investigations is equally striking. The Model MOU (2007) – similarly to the 2014 generic 
version for military contingents – severely restricted the pre-existing powers of the UN/Office 
of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to investigate misconduct and crime allegedly 
committed by members of national contingents, placing the primary responsibility for 
conducting investigations with the TCC.136 These restrictions apparently did not apply to 
FPUs.137 At any event, the 2014 generic version for FPUs confirms in the first place the 
competence of the UN/OIOS to investigate, while also recognizing the rights of the PCC and 
even of the host State to conduct their own investigations.138 Significantly, the FPU version 
even attempts to eliminate a problem in this context, commonly faced by the UN in relation to 
MMsNCs when intending to exercise its (in that context secondary) right to conduct 
administrative investigations, by stating that  
 
[t]he Government undertakes to ensure that no individual against whom there 
are allegations of any forms of misconduct is repatriated before the conclusion 
of the investigation by the United Nations and a determination is made 
regarding the appropriate action to be taken in the matter.139 
 
 Fourthly, the contributing State’s self-assumed duty to cooperate is formulated more 
broadly in the FPU version than in the generic model for military contingents. Most 
significantly, in the FPU version (in contrast to the one for military contingents), the 
obligation to cooperate is not (explicitly) made subject to applicable national laws (including 
military laws).140 
 Fifthly, the most pertinent dissimilarity can be observed in relation to Article 7 
quinquiens on exercise of jurisdiction. The generic model for military contingents 
unequivocally confirms the exclusive jurisdiction of TCCs laid down in SOFAs (while 
imposing an obligation on the TCC to exercise its criminal or disciplinary jurisdiction).141 In 
contrast, the FPU version confirms the status of FPU officers as civilian police hence as 
experts on mission for the UN and the resulting immunity ratione materiae, while noting that 
they may be subject to host State criminal jurisdiction if such immunities are waived or 
declared inapplicable by the Secretary-General. It even obliges the PCC in the latter case to 
cooperate with the host State.142 In addition, the document seems to build on the idea that the 
host State has a primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction. However, if the host State does 
                                                 
136 See Art. 7 quater Model MOU (2007) and Art. 7 quater Model MOU (2014), Generic Model for Military 
Contingents. Cf. Deen-Racsmány, ‘The Amended UN Model Memorandum of Understanding’ 337 on this 
amendment. 
137 The DPKO’s 2006 ‘Guidelines for Formed Police Units on Assignment with Peace Operations’ (para. 24) 
note that all misconduct must be addressed in accordance with the ‘Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving 
Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’ (incorporating the 2005 amendments, see text accompanying 
notes 109-110, supra), “taking into consideration the authority and responsibilities of the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services”. The authority and responsibilities of OIOS were determined in UNGA Res 59/287 ‘Report 
of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on strengthening the investigation functions in the United Nations’ 
(13 April 2005) GAOR 59th Session Supp 49 vol 3, 79. Cf. text accompanying notes 119-120, supra on the lack 
of intention to cover FPUs by these provisions. 
138 Arts. 7.14-7.15 Model MOU (2014), Generic Model for FPUs. 
139 Ibid., Art. 7.14. Cf. OIOS, ‘Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance Efforts for Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse by the United Nations and Related Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations’ (15 May 
2015) Assignment No. IED-15-001 12, Table 2, noting this problem. 
140 Art. 7.16 Model MOU (2014), Generic Model for FPUs and Art 7.14 Model MOU (2014), Generic Model for 
Military Contingents.  
141 Arts. 7.22.-7.23 Model MOU (2014), Generic Model for Military Contingents. 
142 Arts. 7.17-7.18 Model MOU (2014), Generic Model for FPUs. 
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not prosecute the accused FPU officer(s), the PCC is obliged to do so. The latter is also to 
undertake to exercise disciplinary jurisdiction if necessary. Moreover, the provisions on 
jurisdiction recall that in accordance with UNGA resolution 66/93143, the PCC is requested to 
extend its jurisdiction to crimes committed by its FPU officers while on mission.144 
 Finally, the two versions of the last provision of relevance, Article 7 sexiens on 
accountability, also display important differences. Admittedly, at the outset and similarly to 
the rules of the generic model for military contingents, the version for FPUs confirms the duty 
of the PCC to ensure accountability and to inform the Secretary-General of the progress made 
in the process of holding FPU officers accountable if justified, as well as of the final outcome 
of that process. Yet, the provisions of the generic version for FPUs clearly reflect the lack of 
PCCs’ exclusive criminal jurisdiction, the more extensive rights of the UN to investigate and 
to adopt administrative measures in relation to FPU officers found guilty as well as the right 
of the host State to prosecute FPU officers.145  
 As stated in the Introduction of the 2014 COE Manual, this text replaces the previous 
edition.146 It was also taken note of by the UNGA in resolution 68/282.147 Accordingly, the 
                                                 
143 UNGA Res 66/93 ‘Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission’ (9 December 
2011) GAOR 66th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 564. In paragraph 3 of this (legally non-binding) resolution, the 
UNGA  
 
[s]trongly urge[d] all States to consider establishing, to the extent that they have not yet done 
so, jurisdiction over crimes, particularly those of a serious nature, as known in their existing 
domestic criminal laws, committed by their nationals while serving as United Nations officials 
or experts on mission, at least where the conduct as defined in the law of the State establishing 
jurisdiction also constitutes a crime under the laws of the host State.  
 
This resolution was adopted as part of the process aimed at ensuring the criminal accountability of UN officials 
and experts on mission (see text accompanying notes 174-176, infra). In fact, the UNGA has included such 
provisions in its yearly resolutions on the criminal accountability of UN officials and experts on mission since 
2007 (UN Docs. A/Res/62/63 (2007), para. 3; A/Res/63/119 (2007), para. 3; A/Res/64/110 (2009), paras. 3 and 
14; A/Res/65/20 (2010), paras. 3 and 15; A/Res/66/93 (2011), paras. 3 and 15; A/Res/67/88 (2012), paras. 3 and 
15; A/Res/68/105 (2013), paras. 3 and 15; A/Res/69/114 (2014), paras. 3 and 15 and A/Res/70/20 (2015), paras. 
7 and 21). 
144 Arts. 7.19-7.20 Model MOU (2014), Generic Model for FPUs. It may be noted that in this sense the 
distinction between MMsNCs and FPU officers indirectly relied on by the OLA in 2004 (see text accompanying 
note 93, supra) is closing. Yearly reports of the Secretary-General indicate that member States are making some 
progress in this field (UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General: Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission’ (11 August 2008) UN Docs. A/63/260 and (26 September 2008) Add.1; (28 
July 2009) A/64/183 and (22 September 2009) Add.1; (29 July 2010) A/65/185; (25 July 2011) A/66/174 and 
(23 September 2011) Add.1; (31 July 2012) A/67/213; (22 July 2013) A/68/173; (30 July 2014) A/69/210; (28 
July 2015) A/70/208. However, it is questionable even in relation to MMsNCs if the existence of sending State 
criminal justification can justify depriving the host State thereof (see text accompanying notes 171-172, infra). 
This amendment is thus unlikely to have practical consequences in terms of the status of FPUs and/or for the 
relevant competences of the UN and host States. 
145 See and compare Arts. 7.24.-7.27 Model MOU (2014), Generic Model for Military Contingents and Arts. 
7.21-7.24 Model MOU (2014), Generic Model for FPUs. 
146 COE Manual (2014) 6, para. 17. In turn, the previous version (UNGA ‘Manual on Policies and Procedures 
Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors 
Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual)’ (27 October 2011) UN Doc A/C.5/66/8 6, para. 16) 
superseded the text which contained the Model MOU (2007). New MOUs are developed based on the 2014 
Model (e.g. Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of 
Serbia Contributing Resources to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the 
Central African Republic (2 November 2015) UN Doc DFS/MINUSCA/SRB/01 
<http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/cir/pdf/predlozi_zakona/315-16.pdf>) and the new provisions 
are being implemented in old MOUs as well. (UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General: Overview of the 
financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations: budget performance for the period from 1 July 2014 to 
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2014 version will clearly be used for negotiating future MOUs to regulate the contribution of 
new FPUs.  
The above provisions confirm the position that FPU officers are experts on mission for 
the UN, not subject to exclusive PCC jurisdiction. Yet, the C-34’s 2014 annual report repeats 
that the determination of SEA related misconduct, “for military and police personnel, is based 
on investigations by troop- and police-contributing countries, as stipulated under the revised 
memorandum of understanding”.148 This statement may indicate that the old mind-set – that 
FPU officers (should) enjoy protection from foreign criminal jurisdiction comparable to that 
granted to MMsNCs – still prevails in the Committee.  
Regrettably, the 2014 amendments to the COE Manual and the Model MOU in 
particular have attracted little attention in academic circles, NGOs and even in the UN. The 
fact that since 2014 a separate generic version of the Model MOU has been available for 
drawing up such agreements for the contribution of FPUs has apparently not or barely been 
noticed outside the Organization.149 In addition, even some recent UN documents still refer to 
the old version of the Model MOU.150 On the other hand, recent UN instruments and 
documents display considerable uniformity in their treatment of FPU officers as experts on 
mission for the UN.151  
 
 
V. Fragile Status Quo Or Final Solution? 
 
The above overview of recent developments and opinions indicates that PCCs have lost 
several battles in relation to their appeal for equating FPU officers to MMsNCs so that the 
same immunities and rules concerning criminal jurisdiction would apply to them. The UN 
(Secretariat) appears to have been little moved by the reference in the reports of the Special 
Committee to the enforcement tasks of UNPOL/FPU officers in particular or by the requests 
to grant PCCs exclusive criminal jurisdiction over such personnel in general.  
While there is much wisdom to the idiom “never say never”, it is likely that the 
present solution represents more than just a temporary status quo. Members of the C-34 seem 
to have ceased to call for changes, even though they may not uniformly accept the current 
legal position of FPU officers. On the other hand, (recent) UN opinions, documents and 
instruments are very consistent, stating that FPU members (like IPOs) are experts on mission 
                                                                                                                                                        
30 June 2015 and budget for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017’ (23 February 2016) UN Doc 
A/70/749 Annex V 83, para. A.1.) 
147 UNGA Res 68/282 ‘Triennial review of the rates and standards for reimbursement to Member States for 
contingent-owned equipment’ (30 June 2014) GAOR 68th Session Supp 49 vol 3, 107. 
148 UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 2014 Substantive Session’, para. 67. 
See note 126, supra and accompanying text on the incompatibility of this formulation with existing rules. 
149 See e.g. <http://www.codebluecampaign.com/un-docs/>, ‘Revised Model MOU’, containing the old version. 
150 See e.g. OIOS ‘Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance Efforts for Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse by the United Nations and Related Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations’ 5 and 15; M. Deschamps, H.B. 
Jallow, Y. Sooka ‘Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Report of an Independent 
Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African 
Republic’ (17 December 2015) <http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/centafricrepub/Independent-Review-
Report.pdf> 24-25; DPKO/DFS ‘Guidelines on Police Command in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
and Special Political Missions’ (2015) Ref. 2015.14 24; ‘Guidelines on Police Operations in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions’ 27. Sed contra, e.g., Department of Political Affairs, 
DPKO and DFS ‘Policy on Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field Missions’ (2015) Ref. 2015.10 
19, listing inter alia “Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and Police 
Contributing Countries for the deployment of Formed Police Units” in the references section.  
151 E.g. ‘Policy on Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field Missions’ para. 11.5 and documents listed 
in note 129, supra.  
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for the Organization, not exclusively subject to criminal jurisdiction of PCCs.152 The recent 
changes to the Model MOU confirm this position beyond doubt. 
This outcome is not surprising in light of the fact that the similarities between FPU 
officers and MMsNCs are not sufficiently pronounced to justify the parallel treatment 
proposed by the C-34. True, FPU officers may be required to carry out (limited) enforcement 
tasks. However, as indicated above,153 they are only lightly armed and their enforcement tasks 
do not reach the level of severity that military personnel are commonly required to undertake. 
Admittedly, the “political sensitivities” concerning executive tasks and hence the unpopularity 
of such mandates154 may not have been possible to predict in the early 2000s. Yet, in 
hindsight, the Committee’s emphasis on the need for FPU officers (or for civilian police 
personnel in general) to undertake enforcement measures – aimed at supporting a parallel with 
military personnel – appears exaggerated. 
In the context of armed forces personnel, the related argument that a military 
commander must be able to maintain an exceptionally high level of discipline and control 
over the forces under his command (which could be inhibited by outside interference such as 
the authority of other States to exercise criminal jurisdiction its members) admittedly has 
some appeal.155 It may be explained for instance by reference to considerations related to the 
tasks and means available to such personnel (i.e. the ability and not uncommon requirement to 
use lethal force), the safety of the unit in extremely hostile situations and the obligations on 
the State to ensure that its forces do not violate international (humanitarian) law.  
However, the armed forces are clearly a unique organ:  
 
soldiers are in the category of state organs over which states exercise, or at 
least should exercise, the strictest control because they are entrusted with the 
legal capacity to use lethal force against citizens of another state. Moreover, 
they are trained to obey unconditionally the lawful instructions and discipline 
of the army.156  
 
However, the above features commonly invoked in relation to operational necessity do not 
apply (quite as markedly) within police structures, rendering this justification unconvincing in 
relation to FPUs.  
 Admittedly, the fact that MMsNCs are regularly required or authorized to undertake 
enforcement measures and the related idea of operational necessity are not the sole 
justifications of TCCs’ exclusive criminal jurisdiction over MMsNCs. The fact that such 
personnel are already subject to the military (criminal) jurisdiction of the TCC is also a 
prominent argument.157 
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154 See note 38, supra. 
155 On the concepts of operational necessity and unity of command see e.g. R.J. Stanger, Criminal Jurisdiction 
over Visiting Armed Forces, International Law Studies 1957-1958, Navpers 15031, Vol. LII (US Government 
Printing Office 1965) 82-85 and sources cited there and J. Voetelink, ‘Status of Forces and Criminal 
Jurisdiction’ (2013) 60 Netherlands International Law Review 231, 244-249. 
156 L. Cameron and V. Chetail, Privatizing War: Private Military and Security Companies under Public 
International Law (CUP 2013) 163, footnotes omitted, emphases added. The unique nature of military structures 
is widely acknowledged. See e.g. P. Rowe, ‘United Nations Peacekeepers and Human Rights Violations: The 
Role of Military Discipline A Response to Dannenbaum’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal Online 
69, 75; M. Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff 2005) 106. 
157 See e.g. OLA, ‘Letter to the Acting Chair of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, United 
Nations, regarding immunities of civilian police and military personnel’ 325 (arguments cited at note 93, supra), 
and similar statements made in the Sixth Committee of the UNGA (reproduced in the summary record of the 
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However, on closer scrutiny, the underlying idea concerning the sufficiency of TCC 
(military) criminal jurisdiction for ensuring deterrence and/or accountability proves unsound 
even in relation to MMsNCs.158 Relevant problems (e.g. lack of extraterritorial reach) are 
even more pronounced in relation to police/gendarmerie codes. In addition, FPUs may even 
have retired police officers among their ranks to whom such codes no longer apply.159 
Admittedly, the obligation imposed in the most recent version of the Model MOU to extend 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to FPU officers160 may bring some welcome changes in this regard. 
Yet, considering the lack of sufficient progress in this field in relation to MMsNCs161 and the 
reluctance of TCCs to prosecute and punish such personnel,162 PCC criminal jurisdiction 
would likely prove insufficient to ensure accountability and deterrence (and hence incapable 
of justifying a prohibition on host State criminal jurisdiction over FPU officers).  
 Last but not least, political considerations (i.e. the reluctance of States to subject 
members of their armed forces, a State organ par excellence163, to foreign criminal 
jurisdiction and the related fear that member States will not be willing to contribute sufficient 
troops to UN operations) are often cited in defense of exclusive criminal jurisdiction 
clauses.164 However, police personnel are not equally symbolically connected to the higher 
idea of the State as members of the armed forces are. Hence their prosecution abroad is less 
likely to raise equally strong sentiments (among the electorate) of sovereign rights being 
affected.  
It must however be emphasized that the UN cannot conduct peacekeeping operations 
without the support of and – in this context particularly important – personnel contributions 
by member States. Admittedly, the Organization’s resistance to providing FPU officers with 
the legal protection from foreign criminal jurisdiction called for by PCCs may decrease 
States’ willingness to contribute FPUs. The pressing need to ensure sufficient personnel of a 
suitable quality could perceivably bring about a change in the UN’s strict stance, in spite of 
the above observations.  
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Auspiciously, according to UN statistics, the amount of police personnel seconded by 
member States to participate in UN peacekeeping operations has increased rather than 
decreased since the publication of the 2014 amendments to the Model MOU.165 In addition, 
while police contributions are frequently criticized for being of an inadequate quality,166 since 
2008,167 the UN has been actively working on measures to ensure sufficient contributions of a 
suitable standard.168  
At the same time, the UN is increasingly forced to give priority to accountability over 
quantity. In response to new revelations in 2015 and 2016 of large scale SEA by UN 
peacekeepers,169 the Secretary-General proposed inter alia to repatriate entire military units 
and FPUs where evidence shows widespread SEA by such personnel. In 2016, the Security 
Council approved this proposal. Moreover, it requested the Secretary-General to replace 
(military and/or police) units contributed by a State with units from another member State if 
the contributing State has failed to abide by its obligations to investigate such allegations 
and/or prosecute the perpetrators and/or to inform the UN on the measures taken in this 
regard.170  
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The 2015-2016 SEA scandal has produced another relevant effect: the SOFA principle 
of exclusive TCC criminal jurisdiction over MMsNCs has been called into question by 
experts, recommending the UN to “[n]egotiate with TCCs provisions ensuring prosecution, 
including by granting host countries subsidiary jurisdiction to prosecute crimes of sexual 
violence by peacekeepers”.171 These recommendations have been taken note of by the 
Secretary-General in his 2016 Report on ‘Special Measures for Protection from Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse’. He voiced commitments to consult with member States on 
this issue while noting that “[t]his proposal would require extensive legislative changes and 
General Assembly approval”.172 In the face of the long prevailing attitude of TCCs, that 
process is likely to be lengthy and burdensome, requiring a great deal of tact. Yet, the 
consistent attitude of the UN (Secretariat) described in this paper (i.e. rejecting all attempts at 
extending exclusive contributing State jurisdiction to FPUs) may be taken to suggest that 
faced with SEA scandals affecting its credibility the UN is ready to consider this options 
seriously.  
In turn, these developments (in relation to FPUs and MMsNCs) are likely to prove 
mutually reinforcing. The above measures and recommendations indicate that the foundations 
of the so far seemingly “sacred” SOFA rule on exclusive criminal jurisdiction are shaking. 
Now that the principle becomes subject of debate even in relation to MMsNCs,173 it appears 
inconceivable that the UN would be prepared to grant FPU officers such an extensive 
protection from foreign criminal jurisdiction. 
There is however still a small chance of future conflicting signals concerning the 
status and criminal accountability of FPUs, as a consequence of the UN project on the 
accountability of UN officials and experts on mission.174 In response to the 2005 SEA 
scandal, the first Group of Legal Experts recommended the conclusion of a convention on this 
subject.175 The issue and the draft convention prepared by the GLE have been on the agenda 
of the UNGA’s Sixth Committee since then, without much progress. Significantly, one of the 
stumbling blocks has been the question what personnel categories should be covered. In the 
past, several delegations proposed that military and police experts on mission (including IPOs 
and FPU officers) should be excluded, for the reason of them being covered by the criminal 
jurisdiction of the seconding/contributing States.176  
However, there appear to be no legal obstacles in the way of including such personnel 
under the planned convention, along the lines proposed by the GLE.177 In addition, members 
of the Sixth Committee appear to have ceased their calls for the exclusion of military and 
police experts on mission (a major share of the potentially covered personnel) from the 
Convention.178  
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Yet, as the UN has limited means to influence the contents of such an international 
convention, there is still a slight chance – if consensus is reached on the contents of a 
convention at all179 – that FPU officers may not end up being covered, or that the 
competences granted to sending and host States in relation to them would not be identical to 
the existing UN regime. Even though such a solution could (re)introduce confusion 
concerning the status of and rules applicable to FPU personnel – a clearly objectionable 
outcome –, the planned international convention could at any event not (directly) affect UN 
rules and regulations currently in force, nor the rights and obligations of the UN in relation to 
such personnel without the Organization’s approval.180 
 
 
VI. Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
 
Having briefly examined the origins of formed police units and their role and position in UN 
missions, we endeavored to identify the current regulation of the status and criminal 
accountability of FPU officers through a study of the decade-long struggle between the 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the UN (Secretariat). The following main 
conclusions concerning their status and criminal accountability emerged as a result of the 
overview of applicable rules and relevant developments:  
- FPU officers are experts on mission for the UN, enjoying the immunities laid 
down in Article VI of the CPIUN;  
- they thus enjoy immunities ratione materiae; but 
- they are, unlike MMsNCs, not covered by SOFA provisions granting contributing 
States exclusive criminal jurisdiction over the personnel placed at the UN’s 
disposal. Accordingly,  
- they are not exempt from foreign criminal jurisdiction for their private conduct; 
and 
- they may be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the host State following waiver 
by the Secretary-General or certification that the conduct in question was not 
committed in an official capacity. 
- The UN has disciplinary authority over them in accordance with the ‘Directives for 
Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’; 
and 
- the UN and the host State possess investigative powers in relation to them for 
crimes and misconduct committed by them while assigned to a UN mission. 
These principles derive from and/or are confirmed, inter alia, in the UN Model SOFA 
(and in provisions of SOFAs modelled after that document), the ‘Directives for Disciplinary 
Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’, the ‘Regulations 
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Governing the Status, Basic Rights and Duties of Officials other than Secretariat Officials, 
and Experts on Mission’, various UN policy instruments181 and last but not least the recently – 
once again – amended UN Model MOU (specifically the generic version for FPUs). While the 
C-34 initially won a significant battle,182 it subsequently lost the war: under the legal regime 
currently in force, the legal position and criminal accountability of FPU officers is identical to 
that of IPOs (experts on mission) in all relevant respects, showing no resemblance to the rules 
applicable to MMsNCs. 
Considering the existence of pertinent dissimilarities between MMsNCs and FPU 
officers, it is unlikely that further attempts within the UN by (members of) the C-34 to have 
the rules concerning the status and/or the criminal accountability of FPUs amended would be 
successful. This impression is underscored by recent calls within the UN for initiating 
negotiations with TCCs to permit host State criminal jurisdiction even over MMsNCs.  
The process described in the present study has significant implications concerning the 
likely outcome of this proposed change in relation to MMsNCs. The UN’s averse attitude to 
granting PCCs exclusive criminal jurisdiction over their FPU personnel suggests that the 
Organization may be inclined to support such a reform. On the other hand, the persistence of 
(members of) the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in relation to FPUs is 
telling. Their decade-long quest for exclusive contributing State criminal jurisdiction over 
FPU officers renders it very clear that the C-34 will not easily give up that privilege in 
relation to MMsNCs. At the very least, the idea will likely take some time to get used to. Yet, 
the experience related to FPUs indicates that there is hope. The main question appears to be 
whether a sufficient number of TCCs will remain ready to contribute troops – even if their 
military personnel is not exempted from host State criminal jurisdiction – to guarantee the 
continuity of ongoing and future operations in the short term, while others win time to adjust 
their current mindset (and relevant domestic statutes) to the change. 
Next to the above findings and conclusions, the present study teaches us another 
important lesson. The analysis has revealed that the regulation of the status and criminal 
accountability of FPU officers is crystal clear. It is not the rules themselves but their 
amendment and, even more importantly, the failure of the UN and other actors in the field to 
adapt relevant documents, instruments and information materials and to promptly make up-to-
date information available that has contributed to ambiguity. As long as the presentation of 
the rules is not transparent, uniform and clear, the legal situation may remain open to 
interpretation, debate, and, in a worst case scenario, even to abuse. It must therefore be 
emphasized that facilitation of easy access to up-to-date and accurate (legal) information by 
the UN would likely improve the accountability of its personnel and could thus contribute to 
the restoration of the Organization’s credibility.  
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